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INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST UNLICENSED PRACTICE
OF OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS
In the past thirty-five years a number of cases have appeared deal-
ing with the problem of enjoining the unlicensed practice of medicine,
dentistry, optometry, real estate brokerage and countless other occupa-
tions regulated by statute. The class of cases treated in this comment
all involve violation of the license requirement, the basic question being
the capacity of the plaintiff to maintain the suit.'
Three types of plaintiffs have attempted to obtain injunctions: (1)
private individuals-the licensed practitioner or the appropriate occupa-
tional or professional association; (2) law enforcement officers-the
attorney general or local prosecutor; and (3) regulatory agencies-
usually the appropriate licensing board or department. The private
individuals usually rely on a theory of protecting a valuable property
right in the exercise of the license. Enforcement officers contend
basically that unlicensed practice is a public nuisance. The licensing
agency brings suit in the exercise of an express or implied statutory power
to enforce the regulation by injunction. All three approaches have
resulted in nearly chaotic contradictions among the various jurisdictions.
This comment will consider the bases employed in granting or denying
injunctions and the desirability of that remedy. In the conclusion a
suggestion is offered which may overcome many of the weaknesses of
the present situation.
Is THE INJUNCTION DESIRABLE?
Recent legislative regulation of occupations invariably includes the
imposition of a criminal penalty for practicing without a license. Such
conduct is usually classified as a misdemeanor punishable by a small fine
or a short term of imprisonment.2 Thus the enforcement of a statute
which is of little public interest, relatively minor public harm and
results in trivial penalties, is added to the already overwhelming burdens
of the prosecutor. The greatest weakness of utilizing a traditional
criminal sanction as a deterrent probably stems from the circumstance
that unlicensed practice frequently results in steady financial gain
to the violator. An extreme example of the contempt in which the
penalty is held is found in a 1922 Illinois case where 52 unlicensed
chiropractors had formed an association to collect dues to pay fines, costs
1 Decisions dealing with enjoining unauthorized practice of law are not
included due to unique ancillary problems connected with the court's inherent
contempt power over such conduct. See 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 829 (1952).
2 See for example CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE §2426 (medicine, $100-$600,
two-six months) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 91, §16i (medicine, $100-$500, one year
maximum); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 112, §52 (dentistry, $1000 maximum, six month
maximum); NEw YORK EDuc. LAW §6513 (medicine, $500 maximum, one year
maximum) ; OHIO REV. CODE §4731.99 (medicine, $50-$500, one-twelve months).
COMMENTS
and attorneys' fees incurred in defending the members.' Several of
the defendants were alleged to have returned to their practice after
having served short terms of imprisonment. In other instances de-
fendants operate as corporations or as lessees of department store space.
The high competitive spirit which appears to exist on the part of both
the licensed and unlicensed practitioner also tends to lessen the influence
that fear of punishment presumably exercises in other criminal areas.
Criminal statutes and injunctions have one important common
element: they describe conduct which will result in financial or bodily
restrictions. The statute is addressed to the group. A commonly worded
statute might begin, "No person shall . . ." When a person engages in
the described conduct, the slow process of information and jury trial be-
gins, assuming the prosecutor presses the case. On the other hand the in-
junction is addressed to the defendant personally. "The court orders
John Doe . . ." not to act in a certain manner. The original plaintiff
will present evidence of violatioi of the decree to the juryless equity
court, thus increasing the chance of prosecuting further violations.
The simpler procedure and narrower scope of contempt actions under a
decree compared with the possibility of a succession of complete criminal
trials appears to enhance the value of the injunctive sanction. Further-
more, punishment for violation of the injunction, treated as a flaunting
of the court's authority rather than violation of the statute, could be
varied beyond the rigid upper or lower limits set by the usual misde-
meanor provision. This allows the court to apply a flexible fine or
term of imprisonment, appropriate to the circumstances of the case.
The personalization of the proscribed conduct in a decree and the
greater chance of prosecution under the decree cause the injunction to
appear as a more effective device for enforcing the statute.4
SUIT By LICENSED PRACTITIONER
In the absence of statute, the individual plaintiff has to adapt
general principles of equity to the new area of occupational regulation.
3 People ex rel. Shepardson, Atty. Gen. v. Universal Chiropractor's Ass'n,
302 Il1. 228, 134 N.E. 4 (1922).
4 For a description of personal experience with the injunction in the Chicago
area, see McCurdy, Use of the Injunction to Destroy Commercialized Prostitution,
19 JOUR. AMER. INST. CRI.M. L. 513 (1929). Also see Simpson, Fifty Years of
.lmerican Equity, 50 HARv. L. REV. 171, 224-228 (1936).
The Kentucky statutes outline the procedure to be followed upon violation of
the injunction. "In case of a violation of any injunction granted [to the Kentucky
State Board of Dental Examiners] . . . the court . . . may summarily try and
punish the offender; and the court's discretion concerning the degree of punish-
ment shall not be subject to the provisions of §4-32.260 [requiring jury trial for
contempt fines in excess of thirty dollars or thirty hours]. The proceedings shall
be commenced by filing . . . an affidavit . . . The trial may be had upon the
affidavit, but either party may ... demand . . . oral examination of the witnesses."
Ky. REV. STAT. §313.360(2).
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The two traditional grounds for equity jurisdiction which have been re-
sorted to in enjoining unlicensed practice are protection of property
and injunction against nuisance.
1. Property
When a licensed practitioner is seeking an injunction, injury to
property is a common allegation. Such an allegation may serve to
avoid possible application of the virtually extinct rule that equity pro-
tects only property rights.5 There are two discernible aspects to the
property argument: defendant's interference with the exercise of
plaintiff's license, and defendant's interference with plaintiff's profits
by criminal conduct which is also competitive.
The courts which protect plaintiff from interference with his
license hold that the right to practice is a valuable privilege or franchise
granted by the state and therefore entitled to injunctive protection from
interference by unlicensed practice.6 The reasoning behind this con-
clusion appears to be indefensible. The recent Illinois case of Burden
v. Hoover7 illustrates the use of this theory. The court relied upon
two prior license cases, one of which8 involved the constitutional ques-
tion of whether revocation of the license was deprivation of property
without due process of law, and the other 9 the constitutionality of the
statutory requirement of a four-year study for chiropractors. In such
cases the administrative procedure or the statute is held unconstitutional
to protect the individual from abusive exercises of governmental power.
When an injunction is granted to the practitioner to protect his license,
he is being protected from competition arising from unlicensed practice.
A finding that "property" exists in both situations ignores the different
context in which the cases arise. The question in the injunction pro-
ceeding is whether the grant of the license entitles the holder to
restricted competition as an incident of his "property" in the license.
The fact that the license holder should be protected from the state
does not ipso facto mean that he should be protected from an unlicensed
practitioner.
5 Kenyon v. Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E. 2d 241, 175 A.L.R. 438 (1936);
Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); 32 B.U.L. REv. 419
(1952); 25 MICH. L. REv. 889 (1927).
6 Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill. 2d 114, 137 N.E. 2d 59 (1956) ; Boggs v. Werner,
372 Pa. 312, 94 A. 2d 50 (1953); Ezell v. Ritholtz, 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E. 419
(1938) ; McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 10 N.E. 2d 139 (1937) ; Rowe v.
Standard Drug Co., 132 Ohio St. 629, 9 N.E. 2d 609 (1937) ; Sloan v. Mitchell,
113 W. Va. 506, 168 S.E. 800 (1933) ; Taylor v. New System Dental Lab, Inc.,
29 Ohio N. P. (n.s.) 45 (1932).
7 Supra note 6.
8 Smith v. Department of Registration and Education, 412 I1. 332, 106 N.E.
2d 722 (1952).
9People v. Love, 298 Ill. 304, 131 N.E. 809, 16 A.L.R. 703 (1921). The
same reliance on constitutional litigation is found in Sloan v. Mitchell, supra note 6.
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Granting the injunction to 'protect the plaintiff's license' is also
based on reasoning analogous to that found in cases involving competing
utilities or carriers where the nonfranchised utilities were enjoined by
the franchised plaintiff merely upon a showing that the market had
been invaded.'" This "analogy" would seem to arise from carelessly
adopting precedent, since it ignores a fundamental distinction between
utility franchises and occupational licenses.
Both licensing schemes are based on the exercise of the inherent
police power-the power of the legislature to protect public health, safety
and welfare, even at the expense of absolute economic freedom. The
aspect of the police power which validates the utility's exclusive franchise
is the desire of the legislature to ensure the supply of goods and services
to the public at reasonable rates in economic areas where there is a high
cost of entering the field and where undesirable private natural monopoly
may arise. On the other hand, the aspect of the police power used to
validate occupational regulation is the need for immediate protection of
public health or welfare from unskilled practitioners." Regulation of the
healing arts protects the public from immediate bodily harm. Regulation
of real estate brokers and attorneys protects the public from mishandling
of important commercial and social matters. Regulation of watch-
repairing and photography has been struck down as unconstitutional,
there being no relationship between public health, safety and welfare
and the regulated occupations.' 2 The public interest that is furthered in
occupational regulation is not the guaranty of goods and services at
reasonable rates but rather protection from unskilled persons who could
cause substantial harm. If this distinction is recognized and applied to
the issue of who can sue, it follows that a public right is invaded by
unlicensed practice and private persons therefore have no standing to sue."
Most of the courts which deny an injunction to the individual plain-
tiff employ this reasoning.' 4 In discussing the rights of private persons
10 Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 515 (1929); New York. N.H.
& H.R. Co. v. Deister, 253 Mass. 178, 148 N.E. 590 (1925); Davis & Banker,
Inc. v. Nickell, 126 Wash. 421, 218 Pac. 198 (1923); Farmers' and Merchants'
Cooperative Tel. Co. v. Boswell Tel. Co., 187 Ind. 371, 119 N.E. 513 (1918)
94 A.L.R. 775 (1934).
11 See Silverman, Bennett and Lechliter, Control by Licensing over Entry
into the Market, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 234 (1941) where the state cases are
collected and analyzed.
12 State ex rel. Whetsel v. Wood, 207 Okla. 193, 24S P. 2d 612, 34 A.L.R.
2d 1321 (1952) (watchmaking) ; State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E. 2d 731,
7 A.L.R. 2d 407 (1949) (photography).
13 Ezell v. Ritholtz, supra note 6, is contrary to this conclusion. The court
stated, "But since we have held that the purpose of this action is the protection
of the property rights of optometrists, it is manifest that the State is not a proper
party." 188 S.C. at 52, 198 S.E. at 424 (emphasis added).
14 Delaware Optometric Ass'n. v. Sherwood, 122 A. 2d 424 (Del. Ch. 1956);
Contracting Plumbers Ass'n. v. St. Louis, 249 S.W. 2d 502 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952);
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under the statute the language of the New Hampshire court in Board of
Registration v. Scott Jewelry Co.' 5 is typical:
. . . the legislature in some degree suppressed competition.
That is, it deprived incompetents of the right to practice. But
in so doing, it did not deprive them of property unconstitution-
ally, because the motive of the regulation was the public
health and well-being. The legislative purpose was not at all
to benefit competent practitioners but solely to benefit the public
who resort to optometrists for services. It was not the profession
that required protection but the people.'
6
Although the court notes that reduced competition does arise from the
regulatory scheme, this by-product will not serve as a primary founda-
tion for suit by a licensed practitioner. The result achieved by the court
in Burden v. Hoover17 indicates the anomaly of finding such statutes
constitutionally valid in terms of public health and enforcing the statutes
in terms of freedom from competition.
The second aspect of the property approach is based on a theory of
unfair business practice. The licensed practitioner seeks an injunction to
protect his business, as distinguished from the abstract protection of the
license. The basis for the suit arises from conduct of the defendant
which is dual in nature: successfully competitive and criminal. Although
such a case is not generally included within fair trade statutes,' s equity
has apparently recognized the need for protecting certain business interests
from attacks that are beyond the statute. Two Michigan cases, among
others, have granted injunctions to unlicensed, unregulated businesses
preventing their competititors from conducting illegal lotteries which
caused a decrease in plaintiff's business. 9 These cases were used as
authority by the Michigan court in Seifert v. Buhl Optical Co.20 in
granting an injunction to a licensed optometrist. The theory was that
Missouri Veterinary Medical Ass'n. v. Glisan, 230 S.W. 2d 169 (Mo. Ct. App.
1950) ; Lipman v. Forman, 138 N.J. Eq. 556, 49 A. 2d 236 (1946) ; State ex rel.
Rice v. Cozad, 70 S.D. 193 16 N.W. 2d 484 (1944); New Hampshire Board of
Registration v. Scott Jewelry Co., 90 N.H. 368, 9 A. 2d 513 (1939); Silver v.
Lansburgh & Bro., 27 F. Supp. 682 (dictum), aff'd 111 F. 2d (1939); Mosig
v. Jersey Chiropodists, Inc., 122 N.J. Eq. 382, 194 Atl. 248 (1947) ; Georgia State
Board v. Friedman's Jewelers, Inc., 183 Ga. 669, 189 S.E. 238 (1936); Drummond
v. Rowe, 155 Va. 725, 156 S.E. 442 (1931) ; Merz v. Murchison, 11 Ohio C. C. R.
(n.s.) 458 (1908).
15 Supra note 14.
161d. at 376, 9 A. 2d at 518.
17 Supra note 6.
18 Glover v. Malluska, 238 Mich. 216, 213 N.W. 107, 52 A.L.R. 77 (1927).
19 Sproat-Temple Theatre Corp. v. Colonial Theatre Enterprises, Inc., 276
Mich. 127, 267 N.W. 602 (1936); Glover v. Malluska, supra note 18; Featherstone
v. Independent Service Station Ass'n., 10 S.W. 2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
Contra, Cook v. Normac Corp., 176 Md. 394, 4 A. 2d 747 (1939).
20276 Mich. 692, 268 N.,V. 784 (1936). The report of the case does not
indicate the losses suffered. The Michigan Society of Optometrists was also a
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the defendant, violating the law against practicing optometry without
a license, was competitively damaging the plaintiff's business. In such a
case it is immaterial whether unlicensed trade or a lottery is the crime
involved.
A serious limitation on this approach is the problem of proving the
connection between the defendant's criminal activity and the loss of
business by the plaintiff. The Michigan court expressly recognized this
limitation in United-Detroit Theatre Corporation v. Colonial Theatre
Enterprises, Inc.,21 where a trial court decree enjoining the defendant
from conducting a lottery was dissolved. The court held:
The record fails to show that the theatres were in the same
vicinity, thereby creating competition, nor do we find any proof
that the lottery scheme affected the business of plaintiff's
theatres. The restraining order of a court may not be exercised
to enjoin the commission of a crime in the absence of a showing
of damage to persons or property rights. (Emphasis added.) 22
It is clear that mere proof of a dollar loss by the plaintiff and a dollar
gain to the defendant does not alone show successful competition stem-
ming from the crime.2" If defendant's clients would have gone to the
plaintiff had the defendant not existed or if the plaintiff's clients left him
to go to the defendant specifically, rather than leaving him merely to go
to someone else, the case is clear. The urban practioner has a difficult
task in proving that his losses, if any, are attributable to the defendant.
If he is able to show this causal connection an injunction should .not be
denied.
Although this result does not satisfy the usual rule that the basis
for equity jurisdiction must exist independent of the criminal statute,
the plaintiff is entitled to conduct his practice and make his business
decisions without continuous damaging interference from criminal of-
fenders. It would seem that in determining the question of an adequate
legal remedy the court should ignore the criminal sanction. Such sanc-
tions provide a public remedy, unavailable to the private plaintiff.
2. Nuisance
Major discussion of the adaptability of nuisance doctrines to un-
licensed practice cases will be developed in dealing with suit by public
officials. Assuming for present purposes that a nuisance does exist, can
the licensed practitioner enjoin it?24 The traditional distinction between
public and private nuisance is that if the harm inflicted on a private
plaintiff, thus weakening the authority of the Sproat-Temple and Glovrer cases,
supra note 19.
21280 Mich. 425, 273 NA. 756 (1937); Eckdahl v. Hurwitz, 56 Wyo. 19,
103 P. 2d 161 (1940).22 Id. at 430, 273 N.W. at 758.
2 3 Moon v. Clark, 192 Ga. 47, 14 S.E. 2d 481 (1941).
24 Little discussion is found in the cases since the practitioner is either
granted the injunction to protect 'property', or denied standing to sue generally.
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person is materially different in degree or in kind from the harm in-
flicted on the public, the individual as well as the state may enjoin the
nuisance.2 5 This is a particularization of the basic premise that one must
be injured, harmed or damaged beyond mere trivia before a justiciable
dispute arises-before one has "standing to sue."
To satisfy the requirement of special harm, the only injury the
licensed practitioner might suffer, over and above the public harm arising
from the defendant's incompetence, is a competitive financial loss.26
To qualify for an injunction on a nuisance theory, the private plaintiff
should have to show the same causal connection between defendant's
practice and his financial losses as is required under the property theory
discussed above. The nuisance approach therefore merely adds to the
woes of the private plaintiff by requiring the demonstration of a nuisance.
Once he has shown his particular special injury, he has already established
a case for an injunction to protect his business from criminal competition.
The nuisance approach may however .be useful in a jurisdiction which
does not accept the Michigan view of enjoining criminal competition. 21
3. Statute
Several states have enacted legislation specifically dealing with the
injunctive weapon against unlicensed practice. Most of these statutes
permit prosecuting officials to maintain the suit. However, California, 28
Indiana,29 and Virginia 30 are among the states which also allow private
individuals to maintain the action.
The validity of the statute in affording injunctive relief is con-
sidered later in dealing with suit by public officials. But it is pertinent
to note here a serious policy consideration which arises when the power
to maintain the suit is granted to the individual. Under the statute, a
showing of personal damage is apparently not required." The result
may well be non-uniform enforcement. The motive of the licensed
practitioner in bringing suit and incurring expense is likely to be personal
rather than a desire to protect the public interest. Where a showing of
private damage is required, as in the unfair business practice theory dis-
cussed earlier, enforcement of a public right may be just as sporadic but
The nuisance approach by the private practitioner was discredited somewhat in
Ezell v. Ritholtz, supra note 6.
25For example, see Poulos v. Dover Boiler Fabricators, 5 N.J. 580, 76
A. 2d 808 (1950). Also see MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (2d ed. 1948)
§165; 4 POMEROY EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §1349; PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, §71 (1955).
26 Missouri Veterinary Medical Ass'n. v. Glisan, supra note 14.
27 Cook v. Normac Corp., supra note 19.
28 CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE §1705.5 allows ten or more licensed dentists to
bring the suit. This was held not to include suit by the local medical society in
Complete Service Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Society, 43 Cal. 2d 201,
272 P. 2d 497 (1954).
29 BURN'S IND. ANN. STAT. §63-1311.
30 VA. CODE §54.200.01.
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the enforcement is merely an off-shoot of the valid assertion of a private
right. The purpose of these statutes, at least ostensibly and constitution-
ally, is the protection of the public, and uneven, privately motivated
application of injunctions is therefore difficult to justify.
SUIT BY PROSECUTING OFFICIALS
Unless specifically authorized by statute, injunctions obtained by the
attorney general or other prosecuting officers are usually based on in-
herent equitable power to enjoin a nuisance. There is no longer any
doubt that nuisance has been expanded beyond its earlier limitation of
misuse of realty by the defendant.3 2 One of the many influences behind
this expansion was probably the statutory device, commonly employed
in gambling, prostitution and prohibition statutes, of declaring a violation
to be a public nuisance, thus affording injunctive relief to the local
prosecutor. 33 These legislative determinations of nuisance have probably
served to liberalize the court's attitude toward finding nuisances in the
absence of statutory declarations.34
The right to jury trial provides some limitation on legislative power
to grant the prosecutor injunctive relief based on a declaration of nuisance
for each and every crime.35 The yet undefined limit on the transfer of
criminal enforcement to equity courts may perhaps be found by analo-
gizing the proscribed conduct with traditional concepts of crime and
nuisance.3" It is significant in this regard that bawdyhouses and gambling
establishments involve misuse of realty in a persistent and pernicious
3INo decision squarely on this point has been discovered, however the
statutes do not require a showing of personal damage by the private person.
32 Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, supra note 4.
33 See for example ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 100V2 (prostitution); O0io REv. CoDE
§2915.02 (gambling); TEx. PEN. CODE §652(a) (gambling).
34 In referring to a statute to determine the necessary elements of a nuisance,
the cases generally range from the view expressed in Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371,
106 S.E. 792 (1921) that the nuisance must be demonstrated independent of the
statutory standard, to the holding in New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26, 101
So. 798 (1924) that "the declaration that the establishment is unlawful ... is the
same as to say that the establishment shall be deemed a nuisance." Also see 40
A.L.R. 1145 (1924). Where specific conduct is brought within the control of the
state for the first time by statute, the Louisiana view seems the more practical,
by allowing the equity court to cooperate with the executive in enforcing regulatory
mandates of the legislature.
In People ex rel. Bennett, Atty. Gen. v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E. 2d
439 (1938), the court noted that while statutes controlling chiropractors did not
include injunctive relief, other statutes regulating occupations or distribution of
certain goods did provide for injunctive relief. The attorney general was granted
an injunction in the Laman case.
3GSee Stevens, A Plea for the Extension of Equitable Principles and
Remedies, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 351 (1956).
36 Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARv. L. REV. 171, 226
(1936); 1953 Wisc. L. REV. 163; 57 YALE L.J. 1023 (1948).
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manner, thus bringing such activity within the general framework of
nuisance.
Several courts have justified equity jurisdiction on the premise that
the occupational statutes are not basically criminal, but regulatory in
nature, even though violation is made a misdemeanor." The statute is
viewed as primarily directed at controlling a specified field which is
peculiarly related to public health and well-being. Accordingly, the
criminal penalty is regarded as an adjunct which has been employed as
persuasion for the purpose of ensuring the functioning of economic or
health regulations. Therefore, the maxim "equity will not enjoin crime"
is not considered applicable.
In unlicensed practice cases, the misuse of realty approach was one
of the points mentioned by the Nebraska court in the earlier case of
State v. Maltby"s in supporting the denial of an injunction to the State.
While misuse of realty does not appear to be a requirement in later cases,
virtually all courts would appear to require proof of more than one past
violation before the prosecutor could obtain an injunction. The defend-
ant's actions must be of a continuing nature-before grounds for a decree
arise. Otherwise the criminal remedy will probably be held adequate
and resort to the injunction found unnecessary.39
In addition to the probable requirement of continued violation, some
question has arisen over the extent of the violation of the statute. The
primary point of divergence is the question of the incompetence of the
defendant.
Several courts have limited the injunction to cases involving in-
competent practitioners, holding a competent, unlicensed practitioner not
to be a nuisance.4" The incompetent, untrained practitioner, especially in
the medical field, is clearly inflicting immediate harm on the public health.
Difficulty of proving the current requirements of the board, and com-
paring them with the defendant's qualifications is a major disadvantage
to this approach. Nevertheless, the prosecutor should not be denied an
injunction where lack of the requisite qualifications is proven.
37 Dean v. State ex rel. Board of Examiners, 233 Ind. 25, 116 N.E. 2d 503
(1954); State ex rel. Board of Examiners v. Cole, 215 Ind. 562, 20 N.E. 2d 972
(1939); State v. Fray, 214 Iowa 53, 241 N.W. 663 (1932); Board of Medical
Examiners v. Blair, 57 Utah 516, 196 Pac. 221 (1921).
38 108 Neb. 578, 188 N.V. 175 (1922).
39 For example, Hudkins v. Arkansas State Board of Optometry, 208 Ark.
577, 187 S.W. 2d 538 (1945) ; People ex rel. Bennett, Atty. Gen. v. Laman, supra
note 34.
40Arkansas State Board of Architects v. Clark, 291 S.W. 2d 262 (Ark. Sup.
Ct. 1956) ; State ex rel. McCulloh, Atty. Gen. v. Polhemus, 51 N.M. 282, 183 P. 2d
153 (1947) ; Estep v. State ex ret. Caro, Dist. Atty., 156 Fla. 433, 23 So. 2d 482
(1945); State ex rel. Marron, Dist. Atty. v. Compere, 44 N.M. 414, 103 P. 2d 273
(1940) ; People ex rel. Bennett, Atty. Gen. v. Laman, supra note 34; People ex rel.
Chiropractic League v. Steele, 4 Cal. App. 2d 206, 40 P. 2d 959 (1935) ; State
ex rel. LaPrade, Atty. Gen. v. Smith, 43 Ariz. 131, 29 P. 2d 718 (1934) ; People
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Several cases hold that mere lack of a license alone constitutes a
nuisance. 41 To reach this conclusion, the courts have determined that
failure to comply with the statute is a nuisance per se and no direct proof
of public harm is needed. Although there is no immediate public injury
incident to the work of a skilled practitioner, the denial of an injunction
on that ground would tacitly imply that the defendant himself can
decide whether or not he needs a license. The legislature, by enacting
the regulatory plan, has decided that practice without the approval of the
licensing agency is detrimental to the public interest. Vhere the statutes
have further declared unlicensed practice alone to be a nuisance and
enjoinable, the courts have found the provision valid and have issued
injunctions accordingly." In dealing with statutes which neither declare
a nuisance to exist upon mere violation, nor give the prosecutor power to
maintain the suit, the court should be ready to accept a legislative deter-
mination of 'harmful to the public interest' and issue an injunction upon
a showing of continuous violation. To say that injunctions will be
granted against incompetent practitioners but not against competent
practitioners is the same as saying that there are good and bad invasions
of the public interest. In order to further the enforcement of legislation,
the courts should employ the same standard of 'public intereste in re-
solving an injunction case as is used in determining constitutionality of
the legislative enactment.
SUIT BY LICENSING AGENCY
In several instances, the licensing board has attempted to maintain
the suit. A basic dificulty initially arises from the rule that an agency of
the state has only such power as is delegated to it.43 Where there is no
express grant to the board of the power to enforce the statute by in-
junction, a problem of statutory interpretation arises. The Montana
court in Montana State Board of Examiners in Photography v. Keller44
held that the board only had authority to issue or revoke licenses and
could not assume the prosecutor's functions of preventing or prosecuting
ex rel. Shepardson, Atty. Gen. v. Universal Chiropractors Assn., supra note 3;
Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S.E. 792 (1921); State v. Johnson, 26 N.M. 20,
188 Pac. 1109 (1920).
41 Boggs v. Werner, supra note 6; Commonwealth cx rel. Atty. Gen. v.
Pollitt, 258 Ky. 489, 80 S.W. 2d 543 (1935) ; Kentucky Board of Dental Examiners
v. Payne, 213 Ky. 382, 281 S.V. 188 (1926). Marketing milk without a license
was enjoined as a nuisance in State ex reL Peterson v. Martin, 180 Ore. 459, 176
P. 2d 636 (1947), the court suggesting that a finding that the milk was of inferior
quality was not necessary in order to issue an injunction.
42The leading cases are State v. Fray, supra note 37 and Board of Medical
Examiners v. Blair, supra note 37.
43 Mathews v. Lawrence, 212 N.C. 537, 193 S.E. 730 (1937); Bentley v.
State Board of Medical Examiners, 152 Ga. 836, 111 S.E. 379 (1922). Sears Roe-
buck & Co. v. State Board of Optometry, 213 Miss. 710, 57 So. 2d 762 (1952),
without discussing this point, granted an injunction to the Board in the absence
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violations. A more broadly worded Kentucky statute was interpreted
to include the power of the board to maintain an injunction suit.4 5
Those statutes which expressly provide for enforcement in equity
usually give the board authority to obtain an injunction when it is shown
that the defendant is violating the statute. These statutes have been
interpreted to mean that the defendant must be a habitual violator, or be
threatening to continue violating the statute before an injunction will
issue.46 The Indiana statute is at the other extreme in providing that
proof of one violation on a specific day will suffice.4 7 The court has held
the statute valid and described the provision as analogous to a presumption
of future violative conduct.4 s
Suit by the party which also has the power to issue, suspend or revoke
the license has several important advantages. Endowed with the authority
to implement the act generally, the board probably has a better grasp of
the total situation in the state regarding its particular profession and
would thereby develop a more consistent enforcement policy. This
policy would underly the decision to bring suit rather than the possible
petty motives which would actuate the private practitioner. If the
board utilizes its own attorneys, time and effort would be saved by
having counsel available who are more familiar with the organization
and implementation of the regulatory program. The prosecutor or
attorney general is relieved of the burden of maintaining the suit. The
defendant will not be harassed by the private practitioner in court and
the private practitioner need not expend either the time or money neces-
sary to bring his own suit. Above all, improved administration of the
regulations would result from granting power to the board to execute
the statute in all respects.
CONCLUSION
The injunction is a valuable remedy to prevent violations of occupa-
tional regulation. While it has the effect of restricting competition
economically, the basic purpose of the regulation is to protect the public
interest by guaranteeing competent practitioners. The licensed practitioner
therefore should have no standing to enforce this public right. Where
the licensed practitioner can demonstrate actual financial loss arising
from an unfair business practice, a suit ought to be entertained. From
of any apparent statutory authority giving the Board power to maintain the suit.
44 120 Mont. 364, 185 P. 2d 503 (1947).
45 The duties of the Board included the "... duty to carry out and enforce
the provisions of this act . . ." CARROLL'S KY. STAT. §2636-1, now included in
KY. REV. STAT. c. 313.
46Hudkins v. State Board of Optometry, 208 Ark. 577, 187 SAV. 2d 538
(1945).
4 7 Supra note 29.
48 State ex rel. Bowers [Sec'y of the Board] v. Moser, 222 Ind. 354, 53 N.E.
2d 893 (1944).
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the view of protecting the public interest, merely placing the burden on
the over-worked prosecutor and arming him with the traditional sanctions
available for misdemeanors saps the statute of much strength. It is
doubtful that increasing the harshness of the sanction would appreciably
increase the deterrent effect. Nor could such a step overcome the more
fundamental problem arising from the practical limitations on the
efficiency of the prosecutor and the criminal remedy. The licensing board,
usually empowered to execute the bulk of the staute, should be granted
the power to maintain suits in equity in order to provide not only more
even-handed, consistent enforcement of the statute, but also to base
the injunctive remedy upon sounder policy.
J. Donald Cairns*
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